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PRECAP; Sweeney v. 3rd Judicial District
Jasmine Morton
Oral arguments are scheduled for Wednesday, January 31, 2018, at 9:30
a.m. in the Courtroom of the Montana, Supreme Court, Joseph P. Mazurek
Justice Building, Helena, Montana.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The question in this case is whether the attorney-client privilege
covers an attorney’s communication to a client about a public court date.
This case arose after the petitioner, defense attorney Shannon Sweeney,
refused to disclose her communication with a client who had failed to
show up to a mandatory pre-trial conference and was consequently
charged with bail jumping. The State subpoenaed Sweeney for the
communications and documents between Sweeney and her client to prove
the required knowledge element in the client’s felony bail jumping case,
but Sweeney has asserted that any communication with her client is
protected under the attorney-client privilege.
This case is significant because it will help define the scope of
Montana’s unique attorney-client privilege. Sweeney now asks the
Montana Supreme Court to issue a Writ of Supervisory Control to advise
the district court whether this particular type of communication is
protected by the attorney-client privilege.
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 25, 2016, the Anaconda-Deer Lodge District Court
appointed Shannon Sweeney to represent Dakota James McClanahan in a
drug-related criminal case.1 The district court released McClanahan on his
own reconnaissance and ordered him to maintain contact with his attorney
and to make all court appearances.2 When McClanahan did not show up
for his mandatory pre-trial conference, the State charged him with bail
jumping.3 To convict a defendant of bail jumping, the State must prove the
defendant had knowledge of the court date, and “purposefully fail[ed]
without lawful excuse to appear at that time and place.”4 To prove the
1

Petition for a Writ of Supervisory Control at 2, Sweeney v. Mont. Third Dist. Court,
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/OP%2017-0677%20Writ%20%20Supervisory%20Control%20--%20Petition?id={608DC05F-0000-CF12-AEE2-5704FB011F41}
(Mont. Nov. 15, 2017) (OP 17-0677) [hereinafter Petitioner’s Petition].
2
District Court’s Response to Petition for a Writ of Supervisory Control at 2, Sweeney v. Mont.
Third Dist. Court, https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/OP%20170677%20Petition%20for%20Writ%20--%20Response/Objection?id={90103360-0000-C712-8619B9B6B58EF1BA} (Mont. Dec. 07, 2017) (OP 17-0677) [hereinafter Respondent’s Response Brief].
3
Petitioner’s Petition, supra note 1, at 2; Respondent’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 2–3.
4
Mont. Code Ann. § 45–7–309 (2017); State v. Blackbird, 609 P.2d 708 (Mont. 1980).
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knowledge element of bail jumping, the State subpoenaed Sweeney to
have her testify that she informed McClanahan about his upcoming pretrial conference.5
Sweeney believed that testifying against her client or disclosing
any communication between herself and her client constituted a violation
of the attorney-client privilege.6 Sweeney requested a hearing to assert this
privilege and argue her positions, but the district court denied her request.7
She moved to quash subpoenas from the State to appear and testify.8 The
district court denied her motion but granted a motion in limine from the
State, ruling that Sweeney only had to testify whether she had informed
McClanahan about the final pre-trial conference.9 In response to this
ruling, Sweeney submitted a petition for a writ of supervisory control to
the Montana Supreme Court.
III.

ARGUMENTS
A. Petitioner

The Montana Supreme Court only issues a writ of supervisory
control in exigent cases where:
(a) the other court is proceeding under a mistake of law
and is causing a gross injustice; (b) constitutional issues
of state-wide importance are involved; or (c) the other
court has granted or denied a motion for substitution of a
judge in a criminal case.10
Here, Sweeney argues that the district court’s denial of her request
to invoke the attorney-client privilege in this case is a constitutional issue
of state-wide importance and that the district court is proceeding under a
mistake of law by ruling that the privilege does not apply.11
Sweeney asserts that she is obligated to protect and not disclose
information shared between herself and McClanahan as a matter of both
the attorney-client privilege and her duty of confidentiality. First, she
asserts that the attorney-client privilege is applicable.12 Sweeney states the
Petitioner’s Petition, supra note 1, at 2; Respondent’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 3.
Petitioner’s Petition, supra note 1, at 8; Mont. Code Ann. § 26–1–803.
7
Brief of the Amicus Curiae Montana Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, The National Association for Public Defense, and Sherry
Staedler, Regional Deputy of the Office of the Public Defender for Region 5 at 5, Sweeney v. Mont.
Third Dist. Court, https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/OP%2017-0677%20Amicus%20-%20Brief?id={D0BD3160-0000-C510-8B6F-CF5208264157} (Mont. Dec. 6, 2017) (OP 17-0677)
[hereinafter Amicus Curiae Brief].
8
Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 7, at 5; Respondent’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 4;
Petitioner’s Petition, supra note 1, at 3.
9
Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 7, at 20; Respondent’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 2–3.
10
Mont. Code Ann. § 25–21–14 (2017); Larry Howell, Montana’s Unique Writ of Supervisory
Control, TR. TRENDS 15 at 23 (2009), https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/faculty_barjournals/47/.
11
Petitioner’s Petition, supra note 1, at 5.
12
Petitioner’s Petition, supra note 1, at 8.
5
6
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attorney-client privilege is a bedrock of our legal system, protecting any
communications between an attorney and a client within the scope of legal
representation that were made in confidence.13 She argues that the district
court abused its discretion when it denied her motion to keep her
communications privileged.14
Sweeney dismisses the eight elements used by the Montana
Supreme Court to define the scope of the attorney-client privilege.15 These
elements include:
(1) where legal advice of any kind is sought,
(2) from a professional legal advisor in her capacity as
such,
(3) the communications relating to that purpose,
(4) made in confidence,
(5) by the client,
(6) are at this instance permanently protected,
(7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser,
(8) unless the protection be waived.16
Sweeney suggests the Montana Supreme Court use this
opportunity to simplify their jurisprudence. She argues “simply, the statute
only requires communication.” Sweeney believes that to prove the
knowledge element of bail jumping, she would have to disclose both
whether she communicated the court date to McClanahan and whether
McClanahan somehow communicated his understanding to her. By
couching these exchanges in terms of “communication,” Sweeney argues
that these exchanges constitute protected communications.17
Sweeney also cites her ethical duty against disclosure and, more
specifically, a Montana Bar Ethics Opinion on Rule 1.6 of the Montana
Rules of Professional Conduct.18 This opinion advises attorneys against
telling the district court whether their client has checked in as a
requirement of bond unless the client gives consent.19 Although the district
court did not find the advisory opinion binding, Sweeney argues “the rules
and concepts upon which the opinion is based are not advisory.”20
Sweeney has interpreted this to include communication of a third party

Mont. Code Ann. § 26–1–803; MONT. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.6; Inter-Fluve, 112 P.3d at 261
(citing State ex rel. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Mont. Second Judicial District Court, 783 P.2d 911
(Mont. 1989)); Petitioner’s Petition, supra note 1, at 6.
14
MONT. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.6(b)(4); Respondent’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 8;
Petitioner’s Petition, supra note 1, at 9–10.
15
State ex rel. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 783 P.2d at 914–915; Petitioner’s Petition, supra note 1, at 9–
10.
16
State ex rel. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 783 P.2d at 914.
17
Id.
18
MONT. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.6; State Bar of Mont., Ethics Op. 050621 (2005); Petitioner’s
Petition, supra note 1, at 9.
19
State Bar of Mont., Ethics Op. 050621; Petitioner’s Petition, supra note 1, at 9.
20
MONT. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.6 (“a lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the
representation of a client”); Petitioner’s Petition, supra note 1, at 9.
13
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relayed via an attorney.21
B. Respondents
The respondents take the position that the attorney-client privilege
is not applicable in this case. This stance represents the district court’s
opinion; thus, the respondents argue that the lower court is not proceeding
under a mistake of law. Additionally, they argue that if the attorney-client
privilege is not at play, there are no constitutional issues implicated and
Supervisory Control would not be appropriate.
The respondents contend that Sweeney was conveying
information from a third party (the court) to McClanahan and was not
providing advice to a client in confidence.22 They conclude that Sweeney
has failed to prove that the communication about the pre-trial date was
made in confidence, one of the eight required elements of the attorneyclient privilege.23 Although other jurisdictions have distinguished this type
of third-party communication, the Montana Supreme Court has not yet
spoken on this issue.24 The most persuasive authority cited, United States
v. Freeman, is also a bail-jumping case in which a district court required
Freeman’s attorney to testify whether the defendant was informed by her
attorney about a court order to appear.25 In Freeman, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals found that “the evidence sought to be elicited from [the
attorney] was not of a confidential nature and hence was not protected by
the attorney-client privilege.”26
Further, the district court has the authority to order Sweeney to
reveal the requested information because such a disclosure would be
required “to comply with other law or a court order.”27
The respondents also contend that there is no other option for
proving the element of notice in this case.28 The only other person who can
prove this element, McClanahan, is protected by the constitutional right
against self-incrimination.29
C. Amicus
The Amicus brief, submitted by Montana Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers, et al. contends the Court should grant this petition
Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 7, at 12–13; Petitioner’s Petition, supra note 1, at 9–10;
Respondent’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 7.
23
State ex rel. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 783 P.2d at 914; Respondent’s Response Brief, supra note 2,
at 6.
24
Respondent’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 6.
25
United States v. Freeman, 519 F.2d 67, 68–69 (9th Cir. 1975); Respondent’s Response Brief,
supra note 2, at 6–7.
26
Freeman, 519 F.2d at 68.
27
MONT. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.6(b)(4); see also State Bar of Mont., Ethics Op. 050621.
28
Respondent’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 8–9.
29
Id. at 8; see U.S. CONST. amend. V.
21
22
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because they argue that the attorney-client privilege should apply in this
case and because they warn about the potentially disastrous impacts of
denying this petition. The amici believe granting this petition will uphold
candor to the tribunal, maintain the duty of confidentiality, and preserve
legal traditions and professional standards.30 On the other hand, they argue
that denying Respondent’s petition could destroy Respondent’s law
practice and credibility, degrade attorney-client communication statewide, de-incentivize counsel’s attempts to locate, arrange, advice, or
convince defendants to appear, and overburden the already strained Public
Defender system.31
The amici strongly defend Sweeney’s right not to testify on this
issue, citing the attorney-client privilege, the duty of confidentiality, and
the duty of loyalty.32 Absent a waiver by the client or any exceptions, this
privilege bars disclosure of the requested information.33
Next, the amici look at the bigger picture. They fear that
compelling Sweeney to testify against her client may erode trust and
hinder free communication between attorneys and clients in general. The
policy behind the attorney-client privilege is to give both parties the
freedom to express themselves openly.34 As amici point out, this is
especially critical with court-appointed defense counsel,35 who are often
called upon to “locate, arrange, advise, and sometimes even convince
defendants to re-appear.”36 A decision for the Defense could lead defense
attorneys to be less likely to perform those functions leading to more
missed court dates and a decline in judicial efficiency.37 Further, the amici
believe a decision for the respondents may erode trust between attorneys
and clients. This erosion of trust may have tangible impacts for Sweeney
and other small-town practitioners who may develop a reputation for
testifying against clients.38
Finally, the amici cite cases where the State used other evidence,
such as “testimony of a District Court Clerk, legal assistants or through
submissions of minute entries,” to prove the knowledge element of bailjumping cases.39

30

Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 7, at ii.
Id. at 13–14, 25–27.
32
Id. at 6.
33
Id. at 6–7, 8.
34
Palmer by Diacon v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 861 P.2d 895, 904–05 (1993); Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
35
Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 7, at 11–12.
36
Id. at 14.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 13.
39
State v. Nolan, 66 P.3d 269, 272 (Mont. 2003); State v. Kaske, 47 P.3d 824, 829 (Mont. 2002);
State v. Wereman, 902 P.2d 1009, 1012 (Mont. 1995); Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 7, at 8.
31
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ANALYSIS

The petition for a writ of supervisory control will likely not be
granted. Despite a brief heyday, writs of supervisory control are now used
sparingly and are only appropriate where an appeal is insufficient to
correct the mistake.40 The respondent’s best chance to succeed on this
petition is to argue the “impact of the erroneous ruling.”41 Although the
amici thoroughly covered potential impacts of denying attorney-client
privilege, both the amici and petitioner have failed to show an appeal
would be insufficient in this case. The Court has granted supervisory
control in attorney-client privilege cases, but only on a case-by-case basis
where it has examined the privileged material and concluded that an appeal
would be insufficient.42 Thus far, petitioner has refused to reveal the
contents of her communication with her client, even with a limiting motion
in limine.43
Additionally, the Court will likely agree with the respondents that
the attorney-client privilege does not apply, thus the lower court is not
proceeding under a mistake of law, nor are there state-wide constitutional
issues involved. Since this is a novel legal issue, the Court may still issue
a published opinion weighing in on the issue presented, or they may leave
this issue to appeal.44
The question of whether relaying court dates falls within the
protection of the attorney-client privilege has not yet been decided in
Montana, so the parties have looked to creative authorities. The
respondents rely on jurisprudence from other jurisdictions, which all find
that relaying court dates does not constitute communication.45 These cases
come from multiple jurisdictions that also follow the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, including Rule 1.6.46 Sweeney’s argument, on the
other hand, contends that Montana should adopt an interpretation of Rule
1.6 found in a nonbinding advisory opinion from the Montana State Bar.47
Unfortunately, the advisory opinion that Sweeney relies on specifically
distinguishes itself from bail-jumping cases.48 For bail jumping cases, the
Montana opinion defers to an ABA formal opinion that has since been
40

Howell, supra note 10, at 23.
Id.
42
See State ex rel. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 783 P.2d 911.
43
Respondent’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 4.
44
See Inter-Fluve v. Mont. Eighteenth Judicial Dist. Court, 112 P.3d 258 (Mont. 2005); Hegwood v.
Mont. Fourth Judicial Dist. Court, 75 P.3d 308 (Mont. 2003).
45
Respondent’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 6–7.
46
Austin v. State, 934 S.W.2d 672, 674 (Tex. App. 1996); United States v. Freeman, 519 F.2d 67,
68–69 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Bourassa, 411 F.2d 69, 74 (10th Cir. 1969); In re Grand Jury
Proc., Des Moines, Iowa, 568 F.2d 555, 557 (8th Cir.1977); compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.6 with ALASKA R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.6, KAN. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.6, PA.
DISCIPLINARY R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.6, and TEX. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.6.
47
MONT. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.6; State Bar of Mont., Ethics Op. 050621; Petitioner’s Petition,
supra note 1.
48
State Bar of Mont., Ethics Op. 050621 at 1.
41
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specifically withdrawn because it is considered inconsistent with the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct.49
All the jurisdictions cited by the respondents allow
communication of court dates under the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct.50 Even if Sweeney’s reliance upon the nonbinding advisory
opinion is warranted, the Montana Supreme Court has not hesitated to rule
against these opinions in the past.51
To address the mounting jurisdictions cited by the respondent,
Sweeney and the amici argue that Montana should act independently on
this issue due to our uniquely small Bar and small towns, where word
travels quickly and an attorney can quickly earn a negative reputation by
testifying against clients.52 Sweeney has described the worst possible
outcomes in which this single decision undermines trust between clients
and their attorneys. However, the jurisdictions cited by the respondents
maintain their stance on this issue, speaking to the improbability of
Sweeney’s threatened outcomes.53
Even though a decision in favor of the respondents is unlikely to
single-handedly eliminate client trust, it would certainly limit the scope of
the attorney-client privilege. Any limitations of the attorney-client
privilege should be carefully and narrowly defined.

ABA Standing Comm. On Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 155 (1936); ABA Standing
Comm. On Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 84–349 (1984); State Bar of Mont., Ethics
Op. 050621 at 1; see also MONT. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.6.
50
Austin, 934 S.W.2d at 674; Freeman, 519 F.2d at, 68–69; Downie, 888 P.2d at 1308; In re
Adoption of A.S.S., 907 P.2d 913; Bourassa, 411 F.2d at 74; In re Grand Jury Proc., 568 F.2d 557.
51
State v. Landis, 43 P.3d 298 (Mont 2002); Campbell v. Bozeman Investors of Duluth, 964 P.2d 41
(1998).
52
See Petitioner’s Petition, supra note 1, at 6; Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 7, at 13.
53
Austin, 934 S.W.2d at 674; Freeman, 519 F.2d at, 68–69; Downie, 888 P.2d at 1308; In re
Adoption of A.S.S., 907 P.2d 913; Bourassa, 411 F.2d at 74; In re Grand Jury Proc., 568 F.2d 557.
49

